EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (ESS)
2nd ESS Visegrad Regional Network ConferenceThe conference aims to bring together papers that analyse the state of societies in Central and East Europe in a comparative and/or longitudinal perspective. Talks will address topics covered by the ESS comparatively across Europe and demonstrate how the societies of the region are approaching or diverging from those of old EU member states.
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Program
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DAY 1
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DAY 2
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DAY 1 - 7th June
Venue: HAS CSS Main Conference Room - Ground Floor
Venue: HAS CSS Main Conference Room - Ground Floor
12:00 – 1:00 WELCOME & INTRODUCTORY SESSION
12:00-12:15 Welcome speech by zsolt boda, (Director, institute of political Sciences)
12:15 -12:50 Prof. Rory Fitzgerald (Director ESS ERIC)
European Social Survey: past achievements, new challenges.
European Social Survey: past achievements, new challenges.
12:50-13:00 Q&A by the organizers (VERA MESSING & BENCE SAGVARI)
Structure, Aims and practicalities
Structure, Aims and practicalities
13:00 - 14:40 SESSION 1: EVALUTATION OF DEMOCRACY
Chair: Daniel Oross (HAS CSS)
Chair: Daniel Oross (HAS CSS)
13:00 – 13:20 Endre Borbáth, Theresa Gessler and Hanspeter Kriesi (European University Institute) The Hour of the Citizen – The Evolution of Eastern Europeans’ Conceptions of Democracy
The paper investigates the dynamic of Eastern Europeans’ conceptions of democracy since 1990. In doing so, it proposes a broader perspective on the convergence of European societies as a social process that includes the development of citizens’ expectations towards democracy. The 2012 special module of the European Social Survey on Europeans’ Understandings and Evaluations of democracy provides an excellent source to assess this, since it distinguishes between different dimensions of expectations towards as well as evaluations of democracy. However, since the European Social Survey (ESS) only explicitly inquired into conceptions of democracy in its 2012 round, we combine several surveys on attitudes towards democracy conducted since the transition. Thus, it extends the scope of the ESS and shows its usability for long-term comparisons by matching ESS questions with comparable items previously asked in the Post-Communist Publics Study (PCP) and the World Values Survey (WVS). This allows us to study long-term developments in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the former GDR, Russia and Ukraine. Substantively, we argue that the extent to which Eastern European citizens’ expectations towards democracy converge with those of Western Europeans depends on three factors.
First, citizens distinguish the liberal democratic idea from a vision of social justice and direct democracy. While we observe the convergence of attitudes in terms of liberal democracy, we do not observe convergence in terms of social justice and direct democracy. On the latter two, the expectations of Eastern Europeans remain higher than those of Western Europeans.
Second, current day differences between East and West are not necessarily a result of nostalgia towards communism: by the early 2010s, citizens who lived fewer years under communism held higher expectations regarding social and direct democracy.
Third, higher expectations towards democracy are shaped by the low performance of Eastern European democracies. In 1990, citizens who were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country demanded more from democracy than dissatisfied citizens. 22 years later, it was satisfied citizens who had settled for lower expectations, while dissatisfied citizens maintained or increased their expectations. Overall, we find evidence for converging expectations of liberal democracy between Eastern and Western Europe, while Eastern Europeans remain more critical on the two other dimensions. Thus, we suggest survey evidence of citizens’ attitudes anticipates and mirrors the pattern of political convergence that is also strongest on the liberal dimension, caused, among other things, by the asymmetric process of EU integration.
First, citizens distinguish the liberal democratic idea from a vision of social justice and direct democracy. While we observe the convergence of attitudes in terms of liberal democracy, we do not observe convergence in terms of social justice and direct democracy. On the latter two, the expectations of Eastern Europeans remain higher than those of Western Europeans.
Second, current day differences between East and West are not necessarily a result of nostalgia towards communism: by the early 2010s, citizens who lived fewer years under communism held higher expectations regarding social and direct democracy.
Third, higher expectations towards democracy are shaped by the low performance of Eastern European democracies. In 1990, citizens who were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country demanded more from democracy than dissatisfied citizens. 22 years later, it was satisfied citizens who had settled for lower expectations, while dissatisfied citizens maintained or increased their expectations. Overall, we find evidence for converging expectations of liberal democracy between Eastern and Western Europe, while Eastern Europeans remain more critical on the two other dimensions. Thus, we suggest survey evidence of citizens’ attitudes anticipates and mirrors the pattern of political convergence that is also strongest on the liberal dimension, caused, among other things, by the asymmetric process of EU integration.
13:20 – 13:40 Klára Plecitá (Institute of Sociology Czech Academy of Sciences)
Lost in transition, found in recession? Satisfaction with democracy in Central Europe before and after economic crises
Lost in transition, found in recession? Satisfaction with democracy in Central Europe before and after economic crises
For 25 years, research on democracy has routinely produced evidence that citizens of countries in Central and Eastern Europe show the highest levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their countries. These countries have undergone triple or quadruple transitions of economy, regime, state institutions, and nationality issues in the last quarter of century. And, according to Ágh (2013), they underwent a triple crisis - a transformation crisis in the early nineties; a post – EU-accession crisis in the mid-2000s; and a global economic crisis in the late-2000s. In May 2004 five Central European states (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) became members of the European Union and they were soon put under a great pressure. The public expected that their countries would benefit from the free EU market and economic prosperity would increase. Soon, however, they faced the effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the great recession of 2008-2012, and, in some countries, a real estate market crisis as well. Economic crises have not affected all countries of Central Europe equally and countries also varied in the degree to which economic crises were interconnected with political crises.
While in many old democracies of Western Europe satisfaction with the functioning of democracy have declined as a result of dissatisfaction with the economy and governments’ inability to solve the economic crises coming after 2008, in several new democracies of Central Europe and the Baltic satisfaction with democratic performance has grown significantly. Before the revolutions in 1989, countries of Central Europe and the Baltic (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia) were poor dictatorships (or parts of one), though they were the richest countries in the Eastern bloc. The living standards of their populations were not high and only a few countries crossed the critical threshold for sustaining democracy - GDP per capita of USD 6055 (Przeworski 2004) - in the 1980s.
The populations of these countries reacted to the collapse of the dictatorships with a “revolution of high expectations” and under the label of democracy they expected not only civil freedoms and free, fair and secret elections, but also a Western standard of living and welfare state “overnight”. In most of the new democracies in Central Europe, living standards rose, but still lagged behind the standard of living of the populations of old democracies. After 2014, only in Slovenia, Czechia, Estonia, and Slovakia was GDP per capita higher than in Greece and Portugal, where the transition to democracy occurred in the 1970s. Along with Romania and Lithuania, Czechia, Poland and Slovakia were among the European Union’s fastest growing economies in 2017.
Using data from the European Social Survey Round 1 and Round 8 this study explores the impact of feelings about the economy, trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democratic performance in Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The results of the study reconfirm the economic argument of specific support for democracy.
While in many old democracies of Western Europe satisfaction with the functioning of democracy have declined as a result of dissatisfaction with the economy and governments’ inability to solve the economic crises coming after 2008, in several new democracies of Central Europe and the Baltic satisfaction with democratic performance has grown significantly. Before the revolutions in 1989, countries of Central Europe and the Baltic (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia) were poor dictatorships (or parts of one), though they were the richest countries in the Eastern bloc. The living standards of their populations were not high and only a few countries crossed the critical threshold for sustaining democracy - GDP per capita of USD 6055 (Przeworski 2004) - in the 1980s.
The populations of these countries reacted to the collapse of the dictatorships with a “revolution of high expectations” and under the label of democracy they expected not only civil freedoms and free, fair and secret elections, but also a Western standard of living and welfare state “overnight”. In most of the new democracies in Central Europe, living standards rose, but still lagged behind the standard of living of the populations of old democracies. After 2014, only in Slovenia, Czechia, Estonia, and Slovakia was GDP per capita higher than in Greece and Portugal, where the transition to democracy occurred in the 1970s. Along with Romania and Lithuania, Czechia, Poland and Slovakia were among the European Union’s fastest growing economies in 2017.
Using data from the European Social Survey Round 1 and Round 8 this study explores the impact of feelings about the economy, trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democratic performance in Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The results of the study reconfirm the economic argument of specific support for democracy.
13:40 – 14:00 Jaroslava Pospíšilová (Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University Prague)
Delegation gap in the Czech republic: do the political elites share the democratic attitudes with their voters
Delegation gap in the Czech republic: do the political elites share the democratic attitudes with their voters
Many political scientists are watching with concern how new and traditional European democracies cope with current policy challenges (Pietsch, Miller, & Karp, 2015). One of the common denominators of analyzes of Czech politics in the new millennium is disaffection (Linek, 2016). At the same time, a radical change of the party system, the increasing distrust of voters to traditional parties and the victory of the "antiestablishment" policy are characteristic for Czech politics. Czech voters feel a political disaffection, and how the political elites assess this situation? Can we find differences between voters and elected elites in understanding democracy as such? Is the core issue of Czech democracy a different perception of the democratic mandate? If we use the theory of principal and agent to describe the relationship between voters and their representatives, we can say that the voters as principals conclude a contract with their agents, who, however, understand the content of the contract differently than the contracting authority. The chain of the delegation is problematic at the very beginning (Strøm, 2006). It is assumed that voters, as principals, have the same value system as their elected agents. Moreover, the agent's position is complicated by his anchoring, the understanding of the mandate is influenced by the structure of his political party (Müller, 2000). My research builds on ESS 6 data that explored the understanding and evaluation of democracy by Europeans. The replication of selected issues allows us to monitor how the democratic attitudes of Czech voters have changed over the past 5 years. We can monitor the impact of growing populist movements on increasing the support of direct democracy instruments, nationwide referenda. However, to analyze the relationship between the first two articles of the delegation chain, we necessarily need to complement research on the research of elected elites. The same questions were asked, examining the content of democratic values and, moreover, questions revealing the perception of his own act of representation. Different understanding of democracy between ordinary people and political elites constitutes the delegation gap. It seems that the newly elected agents correspond to the ideas of their principals even less than the agents from the traditional parties. Deficit in the relationship between the principal and the agent is, therefore, paradoxically deepening in Czech politics, the growing fears about the stability of democracy in the country are to be right in this respect.
14:00-14:30 ROUNDTABLE WITH THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE PANEL: WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OUR DEMOCRACIES
14:30-15:00 COFFEE BREAK WITH SANDWICHES
15:00 - 16:30 SESSION 2: ATTITUDES ABOUT MIGRATION
Chair: Endre Sík (ELTE, HAS CSS)
Chair: Endre Sík (ELTE, HAS CSS)
15:00-15:20 Piotr Cichocki, Piotr Jabkowski (University of Poznan, Poland)
Doing surveys ahead of a storm: what insights are provided by ESS7 and ESS8 into the context and impact of the 2015 migration crisis in the Visegrad Group countries
Doing surveys ahead of a storm: what insights are provided by ESS7 and ESS8 into the context and impact of the 2015 migration crisis in the Visegrad Group countries
The two recent ESS waves have been fortuitously conducted in the run-up and the immediate aftermath of the migration crisis of 2015. Thus, ESS7 can be treated as representative of the prevalent attitudes in Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia before questions involving immigration featured prominently in their public spheres, while ESS8 was conducted soon after these rose to highest prominence in the summer of 2015. In our paper we focus on refugee-related question items in order to press two major lines of inquiry. Firstly, an investigation seems warranted into the diversity of mainstream attitudes among the V4 countries registered in ESS7 in the context of external criteria provided by the results of other national and cross-country surveys. This seems especially important in the particular case of Poland, whose ESS-based profile of openness towards refugees is significantly divergent from what could be gauged from other sources. Secondly, on the basis of currently available ESS8 data for Czechia and Poland, it is possible to look into the impact of the 2015 crisis on attitudes towards refugees. Those two countries come into a conveniently interesting contrast in this respect, as the Czech attitudes measured before the migration crisis ranked already among the less open to refugees, while in the Polish case not only were the ESS-measured attitudes comparatively open before 2015 but also this year brought about a precipitous change in the position espoused by the Polish government.
15:20-15:40 Vera Messing, Bence Ságvári (HAS CSS)
Looking behind the culture of fear. A cross-national analysis of attitudes towards migration
Looking behind the culture of fear. A cross-national analysis of attitudes towards migration
Fear and rejection of migrants and foreigners is so widespread in some European countries that it can be seen as a socially shared norm, while in other countries acceptance of migrants and ethno-racial diversity is a widely-shared value. With the recent wave of mass migration, these dissimilarities in attitudes have moved to the forefront of public discussion, and there is consequently a need for a deeper understanding of cross-national differences. In order to contribute to this debate, our analysis aimed to investigate potential factors behind country-specific patterns of anti-migrant attitudes in European countries.
It is important to note that there is no simple explanation for such a complex problem. Most studies, when trying to explain these differences, tend to focus on some of the most basic individual background factors such as demography (gender, age, residence), level of social inclusion (educational qualification, income or the risk of poverty) and political attitudes. These are all valid explanatory factors, but they might lack the more complex perspective which comes from taking into account less elementary or hard-to-measure factors. Our analysis went one step further and attempted to integrate various macro and individual level features.
It is important to note that there is no simple explanation for such a complex problem. Most studies, when trying to explain these differences, tend to focus on some of the most basic individual background factors such as demography (gender, age, residence), level of social inclusion (educational qualification, income or the risk of poverty) and political attitudes. These are all valid explanatory factors, but they might lack the more complex perspective which comes from taking into account less elementary or hard-to-measure factors. Our analysis went one step further and attempted to integrate various macro and individual level features.
15:40-16:00 Ildikó Barna (ELTE, Budapest) Júlia Koltai (HAS CSS)
The Changes of Attitudes towards Immigrants in the Turbulent Years of the Anti-Immigrant Campaign in Hungary
The Changes of Attitudes towards Immigrants in the Turbulent Years of the Anti-Immigrant Campaign in Hungary
Our paper aims to analyse the attitudes toward immigrants in Hungary during the years of the government’s anti-immigration campaign. ESS deals with the topic of migration in its core questionnaire. As it takes place in every two years, it gives an exceptional opportunity to analyse the changes in the Hungarian population’s attitudes toward migrants and also the factors that influence them.
In 2014, the support of Fidesz-KDNP fell sharply. The governing party found a quick “solution” to its problems and launched an anti-immigration campaign. It started already in January 2015 when the Hungarian PM, Viktor Orbán said that ”We [Hungarians] would like to keep Hungary as Hungary.” From this very moment, migration became and has remained the number one issue in Hungary. Eurobarometer showed that as the proportion of those thinking that immigration is among the most important issues in Hungary increased dramatically (Eurobarometer 2018).
In its rhetoric, the government framed migration mainly in the context of terrorism, economic, cultural, religious and social fears, and anti-EU sentiments. In April 2015, the government launched a “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism” and in June a billboard campaign to “promote the results of the National Consultation”. During 2015, there were many legislative changes all aggravating the situation of asylum-seekers culminating in the physical closure of Hungary in September 2015. The campaign continued during 2016, when – in the absence of migrants – it turned against the European Union’s policy on migration, and the presumed mastermind, György Soros behind it (Barna and Hunyadi 2016, 2017).
In our analysis, we plan to use Hungarian ESS data from 2012 (Round 6), 2014 (Round 7), and 2016 (Round 8). The fieldwork of Round 7 took place after the anti-immigrant campaign started, while Round 8 was collected when the campaign was already in full swing. Round 6 will be treated as a reference year.
The aim of our paper is twofold. Firstly, we analyse the changes in the attitudes towards migrants – taking different aspects into account, such as xenophobia, criteria for inclusion, or expected behaviour of the government. We will also form a latent variable measuring the overall attitude of the population. Secondly, we map the different ways, how important factors – such as the interest in and consumption of politics, horizontal and vertical trust, and political orientation – affect these attitudes in the examined years. In these models, we will use demographic control variables as well.
We will utilise Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) for the model in which we explain the forming of attitudes toward migrants (Kline 2011). It has many advantages compared to traditional path models, such as the possibility to use more than one dependent variable, to include error of measurement, and to assess the model’s goodness-of-fit. Nevertheless, the most important advantage is that the differences in effect sizes in the separate years can be compared and tested.
References
Barna IIdikó, and Hunyadi Bulcsú. 2016. Report on Xenophobia, Discrimination, Religious Hatred and Aggressive Nationalism in Hungary in 2015. Manuscript.
Barna IIdikó, and Hunyadi Bulcsú. 2017. Report on Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crime in Hungary in 2016. Manuscript.
Eurobarometer Standard. Accessed February 20, 2018. http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD&yearFrom=1974&yearTo=2016
Kline, Rex B. (2011) Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. New York, London: Guilford Press.
In 2014, the support of Fidesz-KDNP fell sharply. The governing party found a quick “solution” to its problems and launched an anti-immigration campaign. It started already in January 2015 when the Hungarian PM, Viktor Orbán said that ”We [Hungarians] would like to keep Hungary as Hungary.” From this very moment, migration became and has remained the number one issue in Hungary. Eurobarometer showed that as the proportion of those thinking that immigration is among the most important issues in Hungary increased dramatically (Eurobarometer 2018).
In its rhetoric, the government framed migration mainly in the context of terrorism, economic, cultural, religious and social fears, and anti-EU sentiments. In April 2015, the government launched a “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism” and in June a billboard campaign to “promote the results of the National Consultation”. During 2015, there were many legislative changes all aggravating the situation of asylum-seekers culminating in the physical closure of Hungary in September 2015. The campaign continued during 2016, when – in the absence of migrants – it turned against the European Union’s policy on migration, and the presumed mastermind, György Soros behind it (Barna and Hunyadi 2016, 2017).
In our analysis, we plan to use Hungarian ESS data from 2012 (Round 6), 2014 (Round 7), and 2016 (Round 8). The fieldwork of Round 7 took place after the anti-immigrant campaign started, while Round 8 was collected when the campaign was already in full swing. Round 6 will be treated as a reference year.
The aim of our paper is twofold. Firstly, we analyse the changes in the attitudes towards migrants – taking different aspects into account, such as xenophobia, criteria for inclusion, or expected behaviour of the government. We will also form a latent variable measuring the overall attitude of the population. Secondly, we map the different ways, how important factors – such as the interest in and consumption of politics, horizontal and vertical trust, and political orientation – affect these attitudes in the examined years. In these models, we will use demographic control variables as well.
We will utilise Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) for the model in which we explain the forming of attitudes toward migrants (Kline 2011). It has many advantages compared to traditional path models, such as the possibility to use more than one dependent variable, to include error of measurement, and to assess the model’s goodness-of-fit. Nevertheless, the most important advantage is that the differences in effect sizes in the separate years can be compared and tested.
References
Barna IIdikó, and Hunyadi Bulcsú. 2016. Report on Xenophobia, Discrimination, Religious Hatred and Aggressive Nationalism in Hungary in 2015. Manuscript.
Barna IIdikó, and Hunyadi Bulcsú. 2017. Report on Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crime in Hungary in 2016. Manuscript.
Eurobarometer Standard. Accessed February 20, 2018. http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD&yearFrom=1974&yearTo=2016
Kline, Rex B. (2011) Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. New York, London: Guilford Press.
16:00-16:30 Questions and answers & Roundtable with the participants
why is migration so feared in countries where migration is marginal?
why is migration so feared in countries where migration is marginal?
16:30 - 18:00 SESSION 3: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND MOVEMENTS
Chair: Márton Gerő (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS)
Chair: Márton Gerő (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS)
16:30-16:50 Theresa Gessler, Endre Borbáth (European University Institute)
Different Worlds of Contention? Left and Right Protest Across Europe
Different Worlds of Contention? Left and Right Protest Across Europe
The social movement literature argues that while citizens on the left readily use protest mobilization, citizens on the right only settle for it as a ‘second best option’. However, most studies are based on aggregated cross-national comparisons or only include North-Western Europe. We contend the aggregate-level perspective hides a fundamentally different dynamic of protest in the different parts of Europe. Based on individual level data from all currently available waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2016), we investigate the relationship between ideology and protest. We find that in Eastern European countries, right-wing citizens are more likely to protest than their left-wing compatriots. We replicate the findings of the previous literature and find the reverse relationship, a greater proximity in North-Western and Southern European countries for leftwing citizens to protest, compared to their right-wing counterparts. Instead of declaring Eastern Europe a ‘pathology’ of the West due to economic backwardness, we hypothesize that the regional patterns are driven by historical legacies, captured by generational differences, alternative value identification ideological labels carry, patterns of mobilization and opposition to the ideology of the government. Firstly, we show that the ideology of the previous regime plays a role and the generations politically socialized during the heyday of these regimes are systematically different. In Southern European countries, the legacy of right-wing authoritarian regimes incentivizes leftwing protests, whereas in Eastern Europe, the legacy of left-wing totalitarian regimes incentivizes right-wing protests. Secondly, we show that unlike in North-Western and Southern European countries where ideological identification carries greater differences in personal values like conformity, universalism, and security, in Eastern European countries the role of values in ideological self-placement is considerably smaller. Thirdly, we show that unlike in North-Western and Southern Europe where parties and unions who mobilize citizens to protest are predominantly on the left, in Eastern Europe these organizations mobilize right-wing citizens as well. Fourthly, we show that over-time the relationship between ideology and protest changes. As right-wing governments are becoming the norm in Eastern European countries, left-wing citizens are ‘catching up’ with the more protest prone citizens on the right.
16:50-17:10 Veronika Patkós, András Szántó (Center for Social Sciences, HAS)
Three aspects of political sophistication: Which one is responsible for partisan bias?
Three aspects of political sophistication: Which one is responsible for partisan bias?
The question whether politically sophisticated voters have more or less biased evaluations than unsophisticated voters have been discussed in the literature on voting behaviour for more than 50 years. While it may seem plausible that politically more sophisticated people have less biased evaluations, studies in the last 50 years have regularly shown a link between sophistication and partisanship which poses considerable challenge to this claim. To investigate the link between partisan bias and political sophistication in detail, this paper decomposes ‘political sophistication’ differentiating between three important elements of the concept 1) the level of education 2) the interest in politics and 3) the time spent on gaining political information. Using seven rounds of the European Social Survey data it identifies political groups based on voters’ winner-loser positions, and it investigates the extent of bias in the political evaluations of these two groups. The main question of the paper is whether partisan bias in satisfaction scores is inherently connected either to political interest, awareness or education. The results show that while being more interested in politics is clearly connected to having more biased political evaluations, the level of education and the time spent on gaining political information are not clearly related to more biased views. Therefore, results are mixed, but compared to earlier evidence, they offer some room for optimism regarding the link between sophistication and biased views.
17:10-17:30 Jozef Výrost, Miroslava Bozogáňová (Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences of SAS)
An outline of social and psychological profile of higher and lower politically participative ESS respondents in R1-7.
An outline of social and psychological profile of higher and lower politically participative ESS respondents in R1-7.
Practically every discussion on political participation starts with stressing the straight link with democracy. But this ties in practice seems not to be so straightforward (Norris, 2002). Citizens activities directed to influence political decisions – what pose the core essence of political participation – could be in one situation perceived by political representatives as pleasing and in another can be very uncomfortable for governing subjects.
Despite the fact that aim to depict the political engagement empirically raises a serious amount of methodological questions (e.g. Lamprianou, 2013) European Social Survey Round 1–7 data offer opportunity to outline some personal (demographic and psychological) characteristics of more and less politically participative individuals. Core module of the ESS questionnaire contains a set of 10 questions which in self-reported answers tape the usual forms of civic political engagement (e. g. boycott some product; sign a petition; vote in last elections). From “yes” answers a scale of political participation was created with reliability coefficient α = 0.642. Respondents of 7 rounds of the ESS (N = 290 757) were, according to the score in the scale, divided into 3 groups: higher (N = 48 582; 16.7%); medium (N = 124 565; 37.1%) and lower (N = 117 610; 35.1%) political participation.
Statistical analyses (chi-square) showed the significant differences between higher and lower groups in some demographic characteristics: individuals with lower education and females are less politically participative and in the groups with older individuals are more politically participative individuals than in groups with younger individuals.
Psychological profile of two groups differs in preferred values – while participative individuals favor more self-direction, universalism, benevolence, stimulation and hedonism, less politically participative individuals favor tradition, conformity, security, power and achievement; participative individuals in comparison express more interest in politics and media; in political attitudes they more positively evaluate their political expertise; they less stress the duty of government to reduce differences in income levels; they are more satisfied with state of economy, government, the way democracy works and health services, but less satisfied with the state of education; participative individuals expresses higher trust to people, but also to the national and international political institutions; they held more tolerant attitudes to gays and lesbians, and immigrants; participative individuals score higher in the both wellbeing indicators – feel themselves happier and are more satisfied with life as a whole.
Also countries differ in the size of group of more politically participative individuals, with Sweden (37.1%), Norway (35.1 %), Finland (30.6 %), Denmark (27.2 %), and Germany (26.2 %) on the top, and Bulgaria (5.0 %), Hungary (5.5 %), Turkey (5.6 %), Russia (5.9 %), and Poland (5.9 %) on the bottom of the rank list.
Despite the fact that aim to depict the political engagement empirically raises a serious amount of methodological questions (e.g. Lamprianou, 2013) European Social Survey Round 1–7 data offer opportunity to outline some personal (demographic and psychological) characteristics of more and less politically participative individuals. Core module of the ESS questionnaire contains a set of 10 questions which in self-reported answers tape the usual forms of civic political engagement (e. g. boycott some product; sign a petition; vote in last elections). From “yes” answers a scale of political participation was created with reliability coefficient α = 0.642. Respondents of 7 rounds of the ESS (N = 290 757) were, according to the score in the scale, divided into 3 groups: higher (N = 48 582; 16.7%); medium (N = 124 565; 37.1%) and lower (N = 117 610; 35.1%) political participation.
Statistical analyses (chi-square) showed the significant differences between higher and lower groups in some demographic characteristics: individuals with lower education and females are less politically participative and in the groups with older individuals are more politically participative individuals than in groups with younger individuals.
Psychological profile of two groups differs in preferred values – while participative individuals favor more self-direction, universalism, benevolence, stimulation and hedonism, less politically participative individuals favor tradition, conformity, security, power and achievement; participative individuals in comparison express more interest in politics and media; in political attitudes they more positively evaluate their political expertise; they less stress the duty of government to reduce differences in income levels; they are more satisfied with state of economy, government, the way democracy works and health services, but less satisfied with the state of education; participative individuals expresses higher trust to people, but also to the national and international political institutions; they held more tolerant attitudes to gays and lesbians, and immigrants; participative individuals score higher in the both wellbeing indicators – feel themselves happier and are more satisfied with life as a whole.
Also countries differ in the size of group of more politically participative individuals, with Sweden (37.1%), Norway (35.1 %), Finland (30.6 %), Denmark (27.2 %), and Germany (26.2 %) on the top, and Bulgaria (5.0 %), Hungary (5.5 %), Turkey (5.6 %), Russia (5.9 %), and Poland (5.9 %) on the bottom of the rank list.
17:30-18:00 Questions and answers & Roundtable with the participants of the panel
Political participation in Central East Europe. What’s different?
Political participation in Central East Europe. What’s different?
20:00 DINNER
DAY 2 - 8th June
Venue: HAS CSS, K0.13-0.14 Ground Floor
Venue: HAS CSS, K0.13-0.14 Ground Floor
9:00 – 10:30 SESSION 4: WELFARE ATTITUDES
Chair: Dorottya Szikra (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS)
Chair: Dorottya Szikra (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS)
9:00-9:20 Mariusz Baranowski, Piotr Jabkowski (University of Poznan, Poland)
Any Differences in Welfare State Attitudes? The Visegrad Group Countries in a European Cross-National Study
Any Differences in Welfare State Attitudes? The Visegrad Group Countries in a European Cross-National Study
The aim of this presentation is to verify the research question whether within the framework of the so-called European social model, there have been changes in citizens' attitudes towards the institutions of welfare state. In particular, attention is drawn to the Visegrad group (V4) countries, i. e. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (without Slovakia, absent in ESS Round 8) in relation to other countries of the European Union. In order to empirically verify this issue, an extended typology of welfare states' models will be used, in which, in addition to liberal, conservative and social-democratic variants (Esping-Andersen 1990), the specific features of post-socialist (Fenger 2007, Aidukaite 2004) and Mediterranean (Moreno 2006) countries will be taken into account. The main research problem concerns whether differences in opinion towards the institutions of the welfare state coincide with theoretical model(s) existing in the literature of the subject (recognizing differences in opinion within V4 countries). An analysis based on ESS Round 8 data (in which the rotating module on welfare attitudes is located) uses the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) construct to test theoretical assumptions about welfare regimes.
9:20-9:40 Kristyna Basna (Institute of Sociology, CAS)
Welfare state in the East and West, findings from the ESS4 and ESS8 rounds
Welfare state in the East and West, findings from the ESS4 and ESS8 rounds
The benefits of the welfare state are often discussed because of its costly nature as some researchers and politicians doubt its cost-effectiveness. These discussions were more frequent at the time of the economic crisis.
This paper analyses citizens’ attitudes towards welfare state and tries to answer the question whether the attitudes towards welfare state were influenced by the financial crisis. Its focus is on European countries and in particular on the differences between east and west as according to some authors there is a significant difference in attitudes towards welfare state between post-communist European countries and the rest of Europe.
The author of this paper uses World Bank data and European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2008 (ESS4 round) and the most recent data from 2016 (ESS8 round). In these years, a module targeting Welfare state was included to the survey, which in detail analyses the attitudes towards the welfare state in general and also attitudes towards specific social policies. Specifically, it focuses on attitudes towards social benefits, opinions on taxation, or on future dependency on social benefits. This paper is the first to compare both the ESS module from the crisis (2008), when many authors questioned the benefits of the welfare state, and the 2016 module, during the time we are experiencing economic growth.
The panel nature of the ESS data allows for multilevel regression analysis – cross-country and analysis in time. With this dual possibility of comparison, this research is exceptional as multilevel analysis on the topic of attitudes towards welfare state has not been possible until now due to the lack of appropriate data.
This paper analyses citizens’ attitudes towards welfare state and tries to answer the question whether the attitudes towards welfare state were influenced by the financial crisis. Its focus is on European countries and in particular on the differences between east and west as according to some authors there is a significant difference in attitudes towards welfare state between post-communist European countries and the rest of Europe.
The author of this paper uses World Bank data and European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2008 (ESS4 round) and the most recent data from 2016 (ESS8 round). In these years, a module targeting Welfare state was included to the survey, which in detail analyses the attitudes towards the welfare state in general and also attitudes towards specific social policies. Specifically, it focuses on attitudes towards social benefits, opinions on taxation, or on future dependency on social benefits. This paper is the first to compare both the ESS module from the crisis (2008), when many authors questioned the benefits of the welfare state, and the 2016 module, during the time we are experiencing economic growth.
The panel nature of the ESS data allows for multilevel regression analysis – cross-country and analysis in time. With this dual possibility of comparison, this research is exceptional as multilevel analysis on the topic of attitudes towards welfare state has not been possible until now due to the lack of appropriate data.
9:40-10:00 Ivana Piterová, Jozef Výrost (Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences)
Welfare Attitudes of V4, Northern, and Western Europe over time in ESS Round 4 and Round 8 data.
Welfare Attitudes of V4, Northern, and Western Europe over time in ESS Round 4 and Round 8 data.
Solidarity and universalism are considered to be the basic principles of the classic welfare state. Moreover, it is the very frequent topic of political debates across Europe nowadays. Solidarity refers to the sense of interdependence or sharing of risks by mutual contributions of citizens. There is a distinction between the horizontal and the vertical organization of solidarity. Former, where people bear on social risks by providing support to others. The latter, where responsibility is on the side of the state (e.g. the government). It appears from this that there is a difference in commitment of citizens (Van Vugt & Peet, 2012). Universalism can be defined as a principle linked to the redistribution of resources in a society and refers to the idea that “all people“ should have access to cash benefits or social services. The preference of these principles can be seen in the attitudes toward providing social benefits to people in need.
As Welfare attitudes module was repeated after 8 years, the database of European Social Survey provides an excellent opportunity to compare welfare attitudes across Europe and over time as well. The module contains a set of questions about the effect of social benefits and services in different areas of life. The scale of solidarity was created from two questions, with reliability coefficient α = 0,703. The scale of universalism was created from 6 questions, with reliability coefficient α = 0,731. The aim of this paper is to apply the same approach to Round 4 ESS data (2008) and to Round 8 ESS data (2016) and to compare 3 groups of countries: the Visegrad Group represented by SK, PL, CZ, and HU (N4=3569, N8= 3310 + the HU data will be released in May), Northern Europe represented by SE, NO, and FI (N4=4507, N8= 4645) and Western Europe represented by GE, FR, and BE (N4=4644, N8=3576) in the level of solidarity and the level of universalism. Providing an answer to the question about differences between groups after 8 years is under the scope of this paper as well.
Statistical analysis showed the significant differences between all three groups in the level of universalism in 2008 and 2016. Results provide an evidence that V4 was less solidary than Western and Northern Europe in 2008, but significant differences in the level of solidarity were proved in all three comparisons in 2016. Northern Europe remains the most solidary and universalistic in the 8-year period, but there is an evidence of a decreased level of solidarity over time. Western Europe is less universalistic but more solidary than V4 but there is a declining tendency in the level of both principles in both regions over time.
Attitudes of people across Europe indicate the tendency of decreasing commitment of citizens to support people in need. Based on ESS data, we could outline that Western Europe and V4 support the idea of social differentiation between people and not equal access to benefits and services provided by welfare state.
As Welfare attitudes module was repeated after 8 years, the database of European Social Survey provides an excellent opportunity to compare welfare attitudes across Europe and over time as well. The module contains a set of questions about the effect of social benefits and services in different areas of life. The scale of solidarity was created from two questions, with reliability coefficient α = 0,703. The scale of universalism was created from 6 questions, with reliability coefficient α = 0,731. The aim of this paper is to apply the same approach to Round 4 ESS data (2008) and to Round 8 ESS data (2016) and to compare 3 groups of countries: the Visegrad Group represented by SK, PL, CZ, and HU (N4=3569, N8= 3310 + the HU data will be released in May), Northern Europe represented by SE, NO, and FI (N4=4507, N8= 4645) and Western Europe represented by GE, FR, and BE (N4=4644, N8=3576) in the level of solidarity and the level of universalism. Providing an answer to the question about differences between groups after 8 years is under the scope of this paper as well.
Statistical analysis showed the significant differences between all three groups in the level of universalism in 2008 and 2016. Results provide an evidence that V4 was less solidary than Western and Northern Europe in 2008, but significant differences in the level of solidarity were proved in all three comparisons in 2016. Northern Europe remains the most solidary and universalistic in the 8-year period, but there is an evidence of a decreased level of solidarity over time. Western Europe is less universalistic but more solidary than V4 but there is a declining tendency in the level of both principles in both regions over time.
Attitudes of people across Europe indicate the tendency of decreasing commitment of citizens to support people in need. Based on ESS data, we could outline that Western Europe and V4 support the idea of social differentiation between people and not equal access to benefits and services provided by welfare state.
10:00-10:30 Questions and answers & Roundtable with the participants of the panel
Anything special about welfare attitudes in Visegrad 4 countries compared to old EU member
states?
Anything special about welfare attitudes in Visegrad 4 countries compared to old EU member
states?
10:30 - 11:00 COFFEE BREAK
11:00-12:30 SESSION 5: DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS
Chair: Ákos Huszár (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS) TB
Chair: Ákos Huszár (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS) TB
11:00-11:20 Denisa Fedakova, Lucia Istonova (Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, SAS):
Job security across Europe. Perception of job security predictors in the Southern, Northern and Central European countries.
Job security across Europe. Perception of job security predictors in the Southern, Northern and Central European countries.
Years between 2007 and 2013 are associated with great economic recession worldwide. Declined economic growth and increased unemployment rates were observed across all Europe during this time. In the 2010 the unemployment rate in Europe varied from 12-19% in the South (Portugal, Greece & Spain), through 7-14% in Visegrad countries (V4: Czechia, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) to 3-8% in the North (Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden).
At that time the European Social Survey Round 5 data (ESSR5, 2010) were collected and showed that job security was the highest in Scandinavian countries, but medium in southern Europe and the lowest in V4 countries. Based on these findings, the current paper aims to examine predictors of job security in the context of all three country clusters. Sample consists of ESS R5 respondents from three Southern European countries (N=1806), four Visegrad countries (N=2818) and four Northern European countries (N= 2627) aged 20-60 who reported being in a paid work in last 7 days with limited or unlimited contract. Logistic regression was applied to analyze the predictors of job security within sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender and years in education), job characteristics (type of contract, opportunities for advancement, overall employability and irreplaceability in current job position) and organizational characteristics (no reduction in pay, no intervention with working hours, work quality, organization thrived financially and increase of organization’s employees). Results even on descriptive level showed noteworthy differences in perceived levels of one’s job security. On the statement: “Job is secure” 41% of respondents from northern countries, 22% of respondents form southern countries and only 13% of respondent od Visegrad participants replied “very true”. One-way ANOVA showed that differences in perceived job security were significant F (2, 7247)= 469.199 , p=0.000. Moreover, differences between country clusters were observed in perception of job security predictors. In case of northern and Visegrad countries all job and organizational predictors correlated significantly with the perception of job security even though the strength of correlations differed (r=0.080** - r=0.203**). Southern countries deviated a bit – there was no correlation between employability (r=-0.026), no reduction in pay (r=-0.005) and work quality (r=0.034) and perceived job security.
It was also observed that sociodemographic variables such as gender, age or length of education don’t play the same role when it comes to perception of job security across chosen countries. Logistic regression showed that southern, northers and Visegrad countries differ when it comes to predictors of job security. Differences were found in all three categories of predictors – sociodemographic, job and organizational. The current paper broadens the understanding of job security concept in period of recession in European context. The idea of job security perception is discussed in the regional and cultural European context.
At that time the European Social Survey Round 5 data (ESSR5, 2010) were collected and showed that job security was the highest in Scandinavian countries, but medium in southern Europe and the lowest in V4 countries. Based on these findings, the current paper aims to examine predictors of job security in the context of all three country clusters. Sample consists of ESS R5 respondents from three Southern European countries (N=1806), four Visegrad countries (N=2818) and four Northern European countries (N= 2627) aged 20-60 who reported being in a paid work in last 7 days with limited or unlimited contract. Logistic regression was applied to analyze the predictors of job security within sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender and years in education), job characteristics (type of contract, opportunities for advancement, overall employability and irreplaceability in current job position) and organizational characteristics (no reduction in pay, no intervention with working hours, work quality, organization thrived financially and increase of organization’s employees). Results even on descriptive level showed noteworthy differences in perceived levels of one’s job security. On the statement: “Job is secure” 41% of respondents from northern countries, 22% of respondents form southern countries and only 13% of respondent od Visegrad participants replied “very true”. One-way ANOVA showed that differences in perceived job security were significant F (2, 7247)= 469.199 , p=0.000. Moreover, differences between country clusters were observed in perception of job security predictors. In case of northern and Visegrad countries all job and organizational predictors correlated significantly with the perception of job security even though the strength of correlations differed (r=0.080** - r=0.203**). Southern countries deviated a bit – there was no correlation between employability (r=-0.026), no reduction in pay (r=-0.005) and work quality (r=0.034) and perceived job security.
It was also observed that sociodemographic variables such as gender, age or length of education don’t play the same role when it comes to perception of job security across chosen countries. Logistic regression showed that southern, northers and Visegrad countries differ when it comes to predictors of job security. Differences were found in all three categories of predictors – sociodemographic, job and organizational. The current paper broadens the understanding of job security concept in period of recession in European context. The idea of job security perception is discussed in the regional and cultural European context.
11:20-11:40 Bence Ságvári (HAS CSS)
Changes in the patterns of trust in Central Eastern Europe. Challenges in measuring trust across time and space
Changes in the patterns of trust in Central Eastern Europe. Challenges in measuring trust across time and space
Countries of East-Central Europe are still often considered as a single unit in terms of their basic social characteristics. However in a closer look this assumed unity is rather questionable. Using data from the consequent waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and other cross-national surveys, I argue that regarding young people’s social trust and other primary indicators of values and attitudes these differences increased to such an extent that divide East–Central Europe into distinct blocks and thus provide explanatory power for understanding diverging paths of economic and social development. In accordance with the theories of trust and generational values, the permanent erosion of social and institutional trust in some countries of the region could be a major issue. Evidence suggests that low levels of trust also have a major implication for both national and European politics by strengthening disappointment and passivity or extremism on both sides of the political palette.
11:40-12:00 Zoltán Ferencz (Center for Social Sciences, HAS)
Attitudes about climate change and energy use in Hungary and in East-Central Europe
Attitudes about climate change and energy use in Hungary and in East-Central Europe
Because one of the rotating modules in the 8. Round of the ESS contains a lot of questions for climate change and energy issues, including: attitudes, perceptions and policy preferences I want to use this dataset to gain a better understanding of the interaction of social and environmental effects of disparities between different social groups in access to energy and specific energy solutions as well as the underlying factors of households’ energy use.
Society is increasingly dependent on energy: more and more activities which constitute individuals’ membership in contemporary society require energy. Over the years, the need to be more sustainable has significantly increased global focus towards energy related analysis. Climate change is foreseen to be the greatest environmental threat and challenge of modern times.
In terms of the parameters influencing energy behaviours, personal parameters have been taken into account in many studies. The most recent behavioural methodologies suggest the consideration of not only the individual and personal characteristics of residents, but also the particular features of their social context.
Social and personal parameters play a substantial role in inhabitants comfort and energy attitude and has been broadly studied. There were identified social and personal factors affecting energy behaviour of households such as: users’ awareness of energy issues, gender, age, employment, family size and socio-cultural belonging. It was highlighted the effect of education and awareness-raising on people's energy attitude.
Social status is an important – even if not the only – factor shaping energy consumption. Access to energy becomes a significant factor in social inclusion or exclusion. As a result, inequalities in access to energy may have significant impact on social structure by contributing to the increase of social inequalities.
Climate and energy policies themselves have fundamental impact on the access to energy and available energy schemes, thus have a grave social and socio-spatial impact, which however is not necessarily acknowledged and analysed. Energy regulations and economical parameters such as energy price and employment have been discussed in various studies. In addition, the influence of these parameters on occupants’ energy consumption behaviour in buildings has been raised by some scholars. Studies show that when occupants are directly responsible for pay energy bills they act more energy frugal.The special Hungarian situation with the governmental public utility cutbacks give a good bases for analysis (and for the comparison) the consequences of the non-market solutions.
Based on the dataset of the ESS 8. Round I try to analyse the similarities and differences of the before mentioned structures in the Hungarian society. If the whole dataset will be available I try to compare the East-Central European countries concerning the climate change and energy use. There are some other Hungarian research projects analysing the energy poverty, the energy efficiency and consumption which are comparable with the results of the ESS dataset.
Society is increasingly dependent on energy: more and more activities which constitute individuals’ membership in contemporary society require energy. Over the years, the need to be more sustainable has significantly increased global focus towards energy related analysis. Climate change is foreseen to be the greatest environmental threat and challenge of modern times.
In terms of the parameters influencing energy behaviours, personal parameters have been taken into account in many studies. The most recent behavioural methodologies suggest the consideration of not only the individual and personal characteristics of residents, but also the particular features of their social context.
Social and personal parameters play a substantial role in inhabitants comfort and energy attitude and has been broadly studied. There were identified social and personal factors affecting energy behaviour of households such as: users’ awareness of energy issues, gender, age, employment, family size and socio-cultural belonging. It was highlighted the effect of education and awareness-raising on people's energy attitude.
Social status is an important – even if not the only – factor shaping energy consumption. Access to energy becomes a significant factor in social inclusion or exclusion. As a result, inequalities in access to energy may have significant impact on social structure by contributing to the increase of social inequalities.
Climate and energy policies themselves have fundamental impact on the access to energy and available energy schemes, thus have a grave social and socio-spatial impact, which however is not necessarily acknowledged and analysed. Energy regulations and economical parameters such as energy price and employment have been discussed in various studies. In addition, the influence of these parameters on occupants’ energy consumption behaviour in buildings has been raised by some scholars. Studies show that when occupants are directly responsible for pay energy bills they act more energy frugal.The special Hungarian situation with the governmental public utility cutbacks give a good bases for analysis (and for the comparison) the consequences of the non-market solutions.
Based on the dataset of the ESS 8. Round I try to analyse the similarities and differences of the before mentioned structures in the Hungarian society. If the whole dataset will be available I try to compare the East-Central European countries concerning the climate change and energy use. There are some other Hungarian research projects analysing the energy poverty, the energy efficiency and consumption which are comparable with the results of the ESS dataset.
12:00-12:30 Questions and answers & Roundtable with the participants of the panel
12:30 - 13:30 LUNCH
13:30-14:30 SESSION 6: ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERSECTING INEQUALITIES
Chair: Vera Messing (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS)
Chair: Vera Messing (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS)
13:30-13:50: Ivan Petrúšek (Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University; Institute of Sociology CAS):
Support for Income Redistribution in the Czech Republic, 2002-2016
Support for Income Redistribution in the Czech Republic, 2002-2016
Income redistribution, as one of the core functions of modern welfares states, has long been the subject of study for various social science disciplines. Recent growth in economic inequalities (as documented by Piketty 2014) reinvigorated interest in policies that would reduce growing inequalities. This article focuses on the demand side of income redistribution and its interplay with changing socio-economic context. Particularly, the paper analyses support for income redistribution in the Czech Republic between 2002 and 2016. Whereas most previous comparative studies employed cross-sectional data for several countries to analyse the impact of socio-economic conditions, few studies have employed the withincountry longitudinal perspective. Therefore, this paper extends the range of longitudinal studies conducted almost exclusively within western market economies by considering a post-communist case study: the Czech Republic. The time span covered by the European Social Survey enables to study individual support for income redistribution and its aggregate-level development before the Great Recession, during the economic decline and subsequent recovery. Aggregate support for income redistribution in the Czech Republic varied significantly during this period. It peaked in the years after the Great Recession (ESS rounds 5 and 6 fielded in 2011 and 2013) when more than 60% of Czechs agreed that “the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. Strong economic growth after the 2012-13 GDP contraction was associated with a lower support for redistribution (43% in late 2016). The paper examines three distinct research questions. Firstly, which individual-level variables are key determinants of support for income redistribution? Secondly, do groups defined by individual-level factors react to the changing economic context uniformly, or do the directions of change vary? Thirdly, which contextual variables have the biggest effect on support forincome redistribution? The article employs a cumulative dataset from seven ESS rounds along with contextual variables generated from the OECD database. Bivariate analyses indicate that educational attainment and income are negatively associated with support for income redistribution. Age, on the other hand, suggests a strong positive correlation with proredistributive attitudes (i.e. older people are much more supportive of redistribution). All groups defined by these three variables react to changing economic context uniformly. Put differently, time trends in support for income redistribution in these groups are parallel to the overall aggregate support. Unemployment rate and net household disposable income growth
are the strongest contextual correlates of pro-redistributive attitudes. When unemployment is high and household disposable incomes are stagnant (or decrease), Czechs are more prone to support redistribution. Regression models mostly confirm these bivariate relationships. Both individual-level models (with year dummy-variables and contextual variables as individual-level predictors) and twolevel random intercept models were employed to more thoroughly scrutinise the bivariate relationships. Contrary to the findings reported in some western economies, Czechs react to worsening economic conditions by demanding more redistribution (Soroka and Wlezien, 2014). Furthermore, this article provides evidence that while differences across countries in unemployment rates are not related to aggregate support for redistribution (Jæger, 2013); within-country trends in unemployment rates may be strongly associated with redistributive attitudes.
are the strongest contextual correlates of pro-redistributive attitudes. When unemployment is high and household disposable incomes are stagnant (or decrease), Czechs are more prone to support redistribution. Regression models mostly confirm these bivariate relationships. Both individual-level models (with year dummy-variables and contextual variables as individual-level predictors) and twolevel random intercept models were employed to more thoroughly scrutinise the bivariate relationships. Contrary to the findings reported in some western economies, Czechs react to worsening economic conditions by demanding more redistribution (Soroka and Wlezien, 2014). Furthermore, this article provides evidence that while differences across countries in unemployment rates are not related to aggregate support for redistribution (Jæger, 2013); within-country trends in unemployment rates may be strongly associated with redistributive attitudes.
13:50-14:10: Ridvan Peshkopia, Jonida Lika and Liri Kosovare Bllaca (University for Business and Technology, Kosovo)
Attitudes toward Refugees in a Larger Europe
Attitudes toward Refugees in a Larger Europe
The crossing into Europe in 2015 of over one million refugees, mainly Syrians, but also Afghans, Iraqis and Africans, probably changed the continent in ways that would be felt for decades to come. That migration tide generated powerful sentiments among both those who supported and those who opposed EU’s opened doors policy toward refugees as well as among those who support and oppose their countries’ EU membership. However, those sentiments were not shared similarly across the two sides of the continent both in intensity and attitudinal and political outcomes, but also with regards to the socioeconomic profile compositions of the two groups. Relying on European Social Survey and local data for Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, this paper tests the proposition that socioeconomic divisions were the main factor that defined people’s attitudes toward refugees in the West, while fear for national sovereignty, security and cultural heritage of own countries, as well as reluctance to embrace EU’s liberal values affect people’s oppositions toward Syrian refugees. The findings would carry both theoretical and practical import because first would help to refine our theoretical understanding of the conditions in which people form their political preferences and priorities, and second would contribute to practically helping policymakers to balance people’s opinions on such a matter with effective policies of both refugee protection and border control. And finally, the paper tests the proposition that antiestablishment sentiments impact similarly people’s attitudes toward Syrian refugees in both sides of the continent.
14:10-14:30: Ivett Szalma, Judit Takács (Center for Social Sciences, HAS CSS)
Social attitudes towards homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the main denomination matter
Social attitudes towards homosexuality in Hungary and Romania: Does the main denomination matter
This study examines social attitudes towards homosexuality in two Central Eastern European neighbouring countries – Romania and Hungary – with many common points, but that do differ in their religious traditions. Most previous studies have found that not just belonging to a denomination, but that the type of denomination also matters: for example, those who belong to the Orthodox Church have less tolerant attitudes towards gays and lesbians than those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
Our main research question is whether the main denomination controlling for all the important individual level variables (gender; age; education; type of settlement; family status; employment background; and attitudes related to family and gender norms) can influence social attitudes towards homosexuality in two otherwise similar countries with different main religions.
The empirical base of our study comprises two longitudinal databases: the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS). We use data from two ESS rounds (of 2006 and 2008) and three EVS rounds (of 1990, 1999 and 2008). Since Romania participated only in the 3rd and the 4th rounds of the ESS (in 2006 and 2008), the Romanian results from 2008 are the most recent ones.
We apply descriptive statistics and regression models. Our main conclusion is that belonging to the Orthodox Church had a more negative effect on social attitudes towards homosexuality than belonging to the Catholic Church (as previous studies have also found), although this effect has weakened over time.
Our main research question is whether the main denomination controlling for all the important individual level variables (gender; age; education; type of settlement; family status; employment background; and attitudes related to family and gender norms) can influence social attitudes towards homosexuality in two otherwise similar countries with different main religions.
The empirical base of our study comprises two longitudinal databases: the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Values Study (EVS). We use data from two ESS rounds (of 2006 and 2008) and three EVS rounds (of 1990, 1999 and 2008). Since Romania participated only in the 3rd and the 4th rounds of the ESS (in 2006 and 2008), the Romanian results from 2008 are the most recent ones.
We apply descriptive statistics and regression models. Our main conclusion is that belonging to the Orthodox Church had a more negative effect on social attitudes towards homosexuality than belonging to the Catholic Church (as previous studies have also found), although this effect has weakened over time.
14:30-15:00 CLOSING SESSION: TAKEAWAYS, FUTURE PATHS OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS WITH RORY FITZGERALD, STEFAN SWIFT (ESS ERIC HQ), VERA MESSING AND BENCE SÁGVÁRI (HAS CSS)
Venue |
Registration |
The event will be hosted at
MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont (MTA TK) 1092 Budapest, Tóth Kálmán u. 4. |
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